Avalanche accidents Lessons learned
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Re: Avalanche accidents Lessons learned
That near miss Avy incident above occurred in early season 2012 and in the report I mention that one of the skiers involved in that incident was also involved in a 2008 incident. I have to dig through the TAY way back machine archived files to find it, and I'll post it when I do.
Yes, some of the nomenclature can be confusing.
For example hangfire is a term used when a gun powder charge didn't go off. We use it to mean any snow remaining in an avalanche path after the Avalanche slid that is still potentially dangerous, especially to a rescuer. Something to be aware of. Look outs are often posted to warn those doing the rescue if additional avalanches occur.
"The D-Scale
The D-scale, or destructive-size scale, has been the
standard size classification in Canada for many years.
When the first version of SWAG was released in 2004 the working group decided that using both scales would be the most complete way to describe avalanche size, so the D-scale was added to US guidelines.
The D-scale is an assessment of the destructive potential of an avalanche.
Sizes range from D1 (relatively harmless to people) to D5 (could gouge the landscape, largest snow avalanche known).
A D4 avalanche could destroy a railway car, large truck, several buildings, or a substantial amount of forest. The description of the potential damage produced by avalanches in each size category is a very useful tool for classifying an avalanche in the field. It also helps all of us select similar categories and thereby maintain consistency between operations and regions.
With the D-scale, half sizes are sometimes reported. The
scale also provides the typical mass (which increases
exponentially) and typical path length for each D-size, though these can occasionally vary quite a bit from avalanche to avalanche."
Yes, some of the nomenclature can be confusing.
For example hangfire is a term used when a gun powder charge didn't go off. We use it to mean any snow remaining in an avalanche path after the Avalanche slid that is still potentially dangerous, especially to a rescuer. Something to be aware of. Look outs are often posted to warn those doing the rescue if additional avalanches occur.
"The D-Scale
The D-scale, or destructive-size scale, has been the
standard size classification in Canada for many years.
When the first version of SWAG was released in 2004 the working group decided that using both scales would be the most complete way to describe avalanche size, so the D-scale was added to US guidelines.
The D-scale is an assessment of the destructive potential of an avalanche.
Sizes range from D1 (relatively harmless to people) to D5 (could gouge the landscape, largest snow avalanche known).
A D4 avalanche could destroy a railway car, large truck, several buildings, or a substantial amount of forest. The description of the potential damage produced by avalanches in each size category is a very useful tool for classifying an avalanche in the field. It also helps all of us select similar categories and thereby maintain consistency between operations and regions.
With the D-scale, half sizes are sometimes reported. The
scale also provides the typical mass (which increases
exponentially) and typical path length for each D-size, though these can occasionally vary quite a bit from avalanche to avalanche."
What's so funny 'bout peace love and understanding--Nick Lowe
Can't talk to a man who don't want to understand--Carol King
Can't talk to a man who don't want to understand--Carol King
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Re: Avalanche accidents Lessons learned
Wow, quite the story. Glad they made it out. I really enjoy the language you use when talking about BC skiing. Some of the terms are new to me, but among the skiing crowd, it's like a 2nd language. As with any activity we invent language or words.
And just looked at the pictures. What terrain!
And just looked at the pictures. What terrain!
Pearl Cherrington
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Re: Avalanche accidents Lessons learned
I was up Highway 20 on the 26th wearing down my snowmobile skaggs observing the conditions. one recent D2 wet avy in one of the LB slide paths was seen.
It was eerily similar to conditions that occurred on the same day, Black Friday in 2012.
I posted this on TAY and NWAC posted the report after placing it in their format for their yearly avy summary.
Here's what I wrote after speaking with two of the snowmobile skiers involved in the incident who were passing along the knowledge to friends.
click the link and scroll down to find complete report with pictures on the link to the Pdf download file.
"Include: events leading to accident, group’s familiarity with location, objectives, route, hazard evaluation, etc.
From TAY TR: "Two BC skiers got their snow- machines stuck, almost simultaneously, in Liberty Bell Slide Path #2 and #3 cones, while the tow behind skier was skinning behind them in order to cross the slide cones.
Due to early season low snow cover conditions, they were on the way to ski Portly Basin, which starts near 5400 feet.. It
was snowing, there was about ten inches of new snow on the road, the snowmobile trail breaking was difficult and visibility was poor.
The skier in path #3 immediately realized he was in a bad spot, got off his
machine, looked up the slide path and saw a wall of snow
heading his way, and ran and jumped off the cone to a safe spot. The avalanche buried his machine, with all his gear, including his shovel.
Meanwhile, the skier in path #2 was hit by a smaller portion of the same avalanche (an avalanche from the face way above can slit into all three slide paths) and it flipped his machine upside down.
He was able to self extricate from the debris. (This skier was the same skier that was hosed from above while following a skin track on Dec, 28, 2008, when a group of guides triggered an avalanche above him and then helped him get out on one ski, see BC6).
The skinning skier was near path #1 when a small portion of the same slide came down in front of him.
The decision was made to leave the machines and not risk another hang fire or re-load slide and come back up when conditions were stable to dig out the machines. They proceeded to ski (1), ski (2)and walk(3 gear buried) back down HWY 20 where after four miles, were met by a group of local snowmobile riders for a friendly lift out.
Rescue Summary Include: description of initial search, report of accident, organized
rescue, etc.
From TAY TR: "Yesterday (11-26)as reported above, a group of BC skiers and local
snowmobile riders went back up and dug both machines out, following safety protocols
with two posted lookouts in two different locations, radio and whistle contact with the
probing/digging party.
The machine in Path #3 was buried under five and one half feet of snow and was about 25 or so feet down slope from its original position when hit. With the help of the local snowmobile mechanic on site, both machines started.
The cool thing about this story, besides the fact that no one was injured, is that of our local
snowmobile riders who are always willing to help out in any way they can.
Those guys have an amazing amount of riding skills and make the balance required to negotiate difficult terrain and deep snow, look easy. People who do not understand the sport cannot understand why these guys like to high mark up into the high alpine zones.
The reason is the same as why we ski there, its fun (risk vs. reward) and it’s their passion.
Having been snow machine stuck in these same active slide paths in the past, along with a friend of mine (guides big mountains), I can tell you it’s no fun. We decided to take the risk and do the digging and we were lucky we did not have to try and dodge massive
amounts of snow heading our way. The paths had all slid right before we arrived to cross them.
The tendency, upon safe return home after dodging a bullet, is to want to drink massive amounts of whiskey, learn from mistakes and be thankful for life.
The skier in path #3, often breaks trail in deep new snow conditions, with his snowmobile and while ski climbing up in the HWY 20 corridor and everyone who follows, greatly benefits from his trail breaking skill, including commercially guided groups, who have
been following his (and others) trails for years around these parts.
After the dig out, three out of the seven continued the day by skiing Pica Bowl in wind affected powder."
https://nwac.us/accident-reports/
It was eerily similar to conditions that occurred on the same day, Black Friday in 2012.
I posted this on TAY and NWAC posted the report after placing it in their format for their yearly avy summary.
Here's what I wrote after speaking with two of the snowmobile skiers involved in the incident who were passing along the knowledge to friends.
click the link and scroll down to find complete report with pictures on the link to the Pdf download file.
"Include: events leading to accident, group’s familiarity with location, objectives, route, hazard evaluation, etc.
From TAY TR: "Two BC skiers got their snow- machines stuck, almost simultaneously, in Liberty Bell Slide Path #2 and #3 cones, while the tow behind skier was skinning behind them in order to cross the slide cones.
Due to early season low snow cover conditions, they were on the way to ski Portly Basin, which starts near 5400 feet.. It
was snowing, there was about ten inches of new snow on the road, the snowmobile trail breaking was difficult and visibility was poor.
The skier in path #3 immediately realized he was in a bad spot, got off his
machine, looked up the slide path and saw a wall of snow
heading his way, and ran and jumped off the cone to a safe spot. The avalanche buried his machine, with all his gear, including his shovel.
Meanwhile, the skier in path #2 was hit by a smaller portion of the same avalanche (an avalanche from the face way above can slit into all three slide paths) and it flipped his machine upside down.
He was able to self extricate from the debris. (This skier was the same skier that was hosed from above while following a skin track on Dec, 28, 2008, when a group of guides triggered an avalanche above him and then helped him get out on one ski, see BC6).
The skinning skier was near path #1 when a small portion of the same slide came down in front of him.
The decision was made to leave the machines and not risk another hang fire or re-load slide and come back up when conditions were stable to dig out the machines. They proceeded to ski (1), ski (2)and walk(3 gear buried) back down HWY 20 where after four miles, were met by a group of local snowmobile riders for a friendly lift out.
Rescue Summary Include: description of initial search, report of accident, organized
rescue, etc.
From TAY TR: "Yesterday (11-26)as reported above, a group of BC skiers and local
snowmobile riders went back up and dug both machines out, following safety protocols
with two posted lookouts in two different locations, radio and whistle contact with the
probing/digging party.
The machine in Path #3 was buried under five and one half feet of snow and was about 25 or so feet down slope from its original position when hit. With the help of the local snowmobile mechanic on site, both machines started.
The cool thing about this story, besides the fact that no one was injured, is that of our local
snowmobile riders who are always willing to help out in any way they can.
Those guys have an amazing amount of riding skills and make the balance required to negotiate difficult terrain and deep snow, look easy. People who do not understand the sport cannot understand why these guys like to high mark up into the high alpine zones.
The reason is the same as why we ski there, its fun (risk vs. reward) and it’s their passion.
Having been snow machine stuck in these same active slide paths in the past, along with a friend of mine (guides big mountains), I can tell you it’s no fun. We decided to take the risk and do the digging and we were lucky we did not have to try and dodge massive
amounts of snow heading our way. The paths had all slid right before we arrived to cross them.
The tendency, upon safe return home after dodging a bullet, is to want to drink massive amounts of whiskey, learn from mistakes and be thankful for life.
The skier in path #3, often breaks trail in deep new snow conditions, with his snowmobile and while ski climbing up in the HWY 20 corridor and everyone who follows, greatly benefits from his trail breaking skill, including commercially guided groups, who have
been following his (and others) trails for years around these parts.
After the dig out, three out of the seven continued the day by skiing Pica Bowl in wind affected powder."
https://nwac.us/accident-reports/
What's so funny 'bout peace love and understanding--Nick Lowe
Can't talk to a man who don't want to understand--Carol King
Can't talk to a man who don't want to understand--Carol King
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Re: Avalanche accidents Lessons learned
I found it to be quite good also, especially the human factor implications of venturing into risky terrain. Large groups, where group dynamics are amplified, has historically and statically been discouraged.mister_coffee wrote: ↑Wed Nov 17, 2021 3:32 pm Yes, the New York Times article was pretty good from a nontechnical standpoint, and about as good as can be expected from a publication meant for all audiences.
And yet we now see groups of up to 15 people in commercially guided ski tours, traveling in lock step through avalanche terrain.
What do the novices who participate in that behavior learn from the guide's example and how will that example translate to their own tours?
But I digress.
The description in the article concerning how snow behaves in an avalanche was also quite good.
One day many years ago while BC touring we were encountering quite a bit of wind slab and ski cutting produced reactive results, mostly size D1 and D2 soft slab avys.
I wanted to learn the properties of snow moving in an avalanche so I skied over behind a medium sized tree and had my ski partner trigger an avalanche above me.
The snow resembled water moving in a fast flowing creek. As it flowed around the tree it quickly reformed behind the tree and wanted to take me down stream.
It is so important to find a truly safe spot when it's necessary to watch your partner ski above you. If that spot is a tree, you can't just stand behind that tree, you have to get up behind it as close as you can and hug the tree
There have been way too many fatalities and burials from Avalanches triggered above the victim by members of their own party.
That lack of a sufficient safe zone happened in that tunnel creek accident, and why situational awareness is of paramount importance, both for the person above and the person below.
Btw pearl, your questions are very good.
What's so funny 'bout peace love and understanding--Nick Lowe
Can't talk to a man who don't want to understand--Carol King
Can't talk to a man who don't want to understand--Carol King
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Re: Avalanche accidents Lessons learned
Yes, the New York Times article was pretty good from a nontechnical standpoint, and about as good as can be expected from a publication meant for all audiences.
Having skied Cowboy quite a few times over the years, my opinion is that it is a fun and not very difficult ski with ugly consequences for the skier if things go wrong. Those gulleys on the south side are scary and I've observed wind packed slabs on the east-facing facets of the gulleys while the west-facing facets were scoured pretty clean.
When I had my long apprenticeship as a ski mountaineer a big part of that was calling the Northwest Avalanche Center hotline multiple times a week, listening to the guy who gave the reports in a weird monotone, and taking copious notes. I also took notes about the NOAA forecasts. Sometimes I was shown how you might sometimes like to use other sources like DOT pass reports. While on the ski with my partners who were teaching me the mysteries I also learned to make observations and take notes of them as well. After most of a season just learning by doing the next season they started asking me where we were going to ski that coming weekend and why, and I'd better be able to back it up.
Somewhere around here there is a box of old notebooks with all of those observations...
Having skied Cowboy quite a few times over the years, my opinion is that it is a fun and not very difficult ski with ugly consequences for the skier if things go wrong. Those gulleys on the south side are scary and I've observed wind packed slabs on the east-facing facets of the gulleys while the west-facing facets were scoured pretty clean.
When I had my long apprenticeship as a ski mountaineer a big part of that was calling the Northwest Avalanche Center hotline multiple times a week, listening to the guy who gave the reports in a weird monotone, and taking copious notes. I also took notes about the NOAA forecasts. Sometimes I was shown how you might sometimes like to use other sources like DOT pass reports. While on the ski with my partners who were teaching me the mysteries I also learned to make observations and take notes of them as well. After most of a season just learning by doing the next season they started asking me where we were going to ski that coming weekend and why, and I'd better be able to back it up.
Somewhere around here there is a box of old notebooks with all of those observations...
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Re: Avalanche accidents Lessons learned
^We didn't get as much new snow as Stevens pass. On the day of that Tunnel creek accident, if I remember correctly, we only had 6 inches of snow. But it fell on a crust where large surface frost (hoar frost=weak layer) crystals had developed up to at least 7,000 feet from my observations.
Stevens had a simular weak layer but way more snow loading from the storm just prior to that accident.
That crust with that overriding weak layer turned out to be the persistent weak layer in 2012 that would plage us for several months.
The heli-ski operation allegedly* was triggering so many avalanches that they shut down for a week I guess to reaccess.
Later, that weak layer also resulted in a guided client being partially buried in a potentially deadly avalanche in the "Powder Cauche" east of SiverStar creek.
That near-miss Avy incident lead to some inaccurate information issued by NWAC.
NWAC reported that near miss Avy accident occurred near Washington Pass where at the time, that weak layer was buried deeper than further east where that accident occurred. Near Wa pass, because that layer was buried more deeply by subsequent snow falls, it was less reactive and we were finding relatively stable conditions even on steep slopes.
NWAC also failed to mention that accident occurred on a commercially guided trip which turned out to have been guided outside of NCMG permitted terrain ( the Forest Service issued a warning letter for that special use permit infraction).
Local BC skiers stepped in and pointed out to NWAC the need for accurate information including exact avalanche locations. We also advocated for place to post skier observations on NWAC, which is a system that is now currently in place.
Also on the day of that tragic Stevens Pass accident, North Cascade helicopter-Ski corp was busy violating their special use permit and breaking the law by cutting down a federally listed sensitive species, i.e. White Bark Pine Trees. They were in the process of creating unauthorized helicopter landing zones, which resulted in FS permit action including a slap on the wrist restitution fee of around $6,000, a warning ticket issued to the heli pilot , and an increase in the scope and use of the permit.
The permit was placed on probation for five years however because the corporation didn't come clean about all other unauthorized LZ they had cut. I was also assured verbally by the FS that no more skier days would be issued unless a Environmental Impact Statement was done.
We'll see if that occurs.
*we were hearing about those avys but not seeing any reports on NWAC.
I spoke with one of the two guides on that Powder Cache near miss accident the summer or so after the accident. He informed me that he had sent his Avalanche report to the Colorado Avalanche Center where it never saw the light of day here.
Local Backcountry skiers continue to advocate for operational transparency to the public for special-use permit holders on our National Forests, including the accurate reporting of all Avalanche accidents
https://www.nytimes.com/projects/2012/s ... nnel-creek
Stevens had a simular weak layer but way more snow loading from the storm just prior to that accident.
That crust with that overriding weak layer turned out to be the persistent weak layer in 2012 that would plage us for several months.
The heli-ski operation allegedly* was triggering so many avalanches that they shut down for a week I guess to reaccess.
Later, that weak layer also resulted in a guided client being partially buried in a potentially deadly avalanche in the "Powder Cauche" east of SiverStar creek.
That near-miss Avy incident lead to some inaccurate information issued by NWAC.
NWAC reported that near miss Avy accident occurred near Washington Pass where at the time, that weak layer was buried deeper than further east where that accident occurred. Near Wa pass, because that layer was buried more deeply by subsequent snow falls, it was less reactive and we were finding relatively stable conditions even on steep slopes.
NWAC also failed to mention that accident occurred on a commercially guided trip which turned out to have been guided outside of NCMG permitted terrain ( the Forest Service issued a warning letter for that special use permit infraction).
Local BC skiers stepped in and pointed out to NWAC the need for accurate information including exact avalanche locations. We also advocated for place to post skier observations on NWAC, which is a system that is now currently in place.
Also on the day of that tragic Stevens Pass accident, North Cascade helicopter-Ski corp was busy violating their special use permit and breaking the law by cutting down a federally listed sensitive species, i.e. White Bark Pine Trees. They were in the process of creating unauthorized helicopter landing zones, which resulted in FS permit action including a slap on the wrist restitution fee of around $6,000, a warning ticket issued to the heli pilot , and an increase in the scope and use of the permit.
The permit was placed on probation for five years however because the corporation didn't come clean about all other unauthorized LZ they had cut. I was also assured verbally by the FS that no more skier days would be issued unless a Environmental Impact Statement was done.
We'll see if that occurs.
*we were hearing about those avys but not seeing any reports on NWAC.
I spoke with one of the two guides on that Powder Cache near miss accident the summer or so after the accident. He informed me that he had sent his Avalanche report to the Colorado Avalanche Center where it never saw the light of day here.
Local Backcountry skiers continue to advocate for operational transparency to the public for special-use permit holders on our National Forests, including the accurate reporting of all Avalanche accidents
https://www.nytimes.com/projects/2012/s ... nnel-creek
What's so funny 'bout peace love and understanding--Nick Lowe
Can't talk to a man who don't want to understand--Carol King
Can't talk to a man who don't want to understand--Carol King
- mister_coffee
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Re: Avalanche accidents Lessons learned
Funny you should mention that accident.
It hadn't snowed in several weeks previous to three days before the accident, it had snowed over thirty inches in those three days, with approximately 20 inches falling in the previous 24 hours. The snowfall was cold so it bonded poorly or not at all to the previous layers.
That right there is enough information to know that nobody should have skied Cowboy Mountain that day. Much less a large and poorly organized group. A very small group who were savvy, experienced, careful, and lucky might have been able to ski it that day without tragedy, but honestly it wouldn't have been worth it.
You can go into more details about the subtleties (and my god there are subtleties) but if you don't pay attention to red flags the subtleties aren't going to save you.
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Re: Avalanche accidents Lessons learned
Here is an article by Andrew Kiefer published in the Avalanche Review After reading it I asked him for permission (he said yes) and posted it on NWhikers in 2014.
Mr Kiefer now works as an avalanche forecaster for the Northwest Avalanche Center.
"Lessons Learned
GNFAC Professional Development Workshop
March 6, 2013, members of the southwest Montana snow and avalanche community assembled in Bozeman to participate in the fourth annual Professional Development Workshop hosted by the Gallatin National Forest Avalanche Center.
The day-long workshop featured a medley of presenters with broad expertise in snow and avalanche research, avalanche forecasting, ski patrolling, ski guiding, avalanche education, mountain search and rescue operations, and institutional risk management within the scope of outdoor education and recreation.
Titled “Lessons Learned," the workshop was essentially a compilation of personal incident accounts in which significant injury or loss due to avalanche hazard occurred or was narrowly avoided.
Throughout the day, many themes emerged, the most consistent of which was the simple truth that, regardless of years of experience, even the most renowned and experienced practitioners in the field of snow and avalanches are not immune to making mistakes. Efforts are made to maintain the highest standard of safety possible, and our professional community has made great strides in understanding the dynamic behaviors of snow and avalanches. Nevertheless, we continue to chart unknown territory, and the eerie reality of trial and error remains. By shining a spotlight on errors and miscalculations, and by being accountable for analyzing our mistakes, great contributions are made to this field.
The workshop began with Drew Leemon’s presentation entitled Risk Management: The NOLS Perspective. By sharing the ins and outs of the NOLS risk management system, long-time risk management director Leemon established a foundational framework for the workshop. With 28 years of incident data that documents remote rescues, medical emergencies, evacuations, and “near misses," NOLS analyzes risk and safety practices constantly and has established risk management as a core component of its institutional culture. With such an extensive incident database, NOLS has established a systematic incident review process. Through documenting, categorizing, and analyzing incidents, NOLS can learn from experience, strive for self-improvement, and continuously revise institutional program standards when necessary. Leemon broke the ice and set a standard of transparency and critical self-analysis for the rest of the workshop speakers.
As Randy Elliot put it so bluntly, “If you can’t be good, be lucky." Listening to renowned avalanche practitioners recount heart-pounding stories of narrowly avoiding getting caught in avalanches is unnerving. But, in recognizing how dynamic and complex the winter backcountry environment is, sometimes lessons are just learned the hard way and, as Karl Birkeland said, “as professionals, we need to recognize when we have close calls and change our behavior.” Workshop speakers, fortunately for all in attendance, walked away from their near-miss incidents informed, grateful, and better prepared for the future.
A recurring theme of the workshop was the importance of terrain selection. As Doug Chabot and Eric Knoff learned on several occasions, appropriate terrain selection is crucial when digging snowpits. Speaking about a slope outside of Cooke City, MT that he and his partner named “Almost Died," Chabot pointed out that it is never worth risking your life or your partners' lives (much less both at the same time) in order to collect data. In support of Chabot's views, Karl Birkeland stressed the significance of route selection and stressed the importance of ascending slopes by the safest up-track possible. Long-time Big Sky snow safety director Jon Ueland underscored the importance of always choosing islands of safety that will offer real protection. “You only know you are in a safe zone if all the snow around you disappears and you are still standing,” he said.
Professionalism and the importance of communication came up time and again throughout the workshop. Decisions made and opinions expressed by professionals carry great significance and can and should have a disproportionate influence on the safety and well being of others. As Nick Meyers, Mike Buotte, and Lynne Wolfe all noted, good communication skills are essential for avalanche control work, when discussing and analyzing the stability of the snowpack, or when simply working with a partner or team in an intense situation.
The familiarity professionals develop with a season’s snowpack or specific terrain can often pose a dangerous sense of overconfidence. As Karl Birkeland attested, it is so important to be thinking about the worst-case scenario and to be intentional with whom you travel in avalanche terrain. "Ski with a partner who will be thinking about avalanches and skiing appropriately,” he advised. And, as Nick Meyers suggested, “Ask yourself: are my thoughts, words, actions an asset or liability to the situation?”
An additional theme that surfaced was the fundamental importance of recognizing and assessing the type of avalanche problem you are dealing with. According to Rod Newcomb, professionals need to be aware that they often analyze the snowpack only from their scope of experience. Instead, he urged professionals to have heightened awareness of obscure and unfamiliar conditions, and to recognize that even the most experienced avalanche practitioners may still be novices to what can happen. Obscure and unexpected conditions are often responsible for close calls and fatalities involving professionals. However, depth hoar, he asserted, is the primary avalanche problem associated with patroller fatalities. According to Newcomb, a reliable rule of thumb with regard to depth hoar and depth hoar-like snowpacks is always "to expect the crown and the slide to exceed your expectation of how far it will propagate, and how large the slide will be.”
Experience with obscure stability conditions offered other workshop lessons. Doug Chabot recounted a near miss during which he learned that even low density, powder snow can act as a slab and produce avalanches. In reflecting on the 1996-97 winter avalanche that demolished the Shedhorn Lift at Big Sky, Scott Savage learned never to trust a rapid load on ice, a crust, or a hard surface, regardless of whether or not facets exist at the slab-weak layer interface. And, regardless of what kind of avalanche problem is believed to be present, Lynne Wolfe urged professionals to ask: “How detectable is the problem?” and “How manageable is the problem?” with the intention of forming an honest, specific, and unbiased opinion of current snowpack stability. Professionals often tend to overestimate manageability; even a small avalanche can pack quite a punch.
As risk management practices develop and become ever more ingrained in the work of outdoor professionals, “near miss” or close call incidents (in which significant injury or loss is narrowly avoided) have become focused opportunities for learning. However, the negative repercussions for outdoor professionals of such incidents -- which range from embarrassment to the loss of a job -- are not pleasant to contemplate. Putting egos aside, the workshop speakers recognized the obvious truth that if you end up spending years in avalanche terrain, accidents will occur, and sooner or later you are bound to make a mistake.
For more information, visit the GNFAC video archive on YouTube at www.youtube.com/user/AvalancheGuys where all the workshop presentations may be seen.
Bio:
Andrew Kiefer graduated from Prescott College this past spring and attended the professional development workshop during his internship with the GNFAC."
Mr Kiefer now works as an avalanche forecaster for the Northwest Avalanche Center.
"Lessons Learned
GNFAC Professional Development Workshop
March 6, 2013, members of the southwest Montana snow and avalanche community assembled in Bozeman to participate in the fourth annual Professional Development Workshop hosted by the Gallatin National Forest Avalanche Center.
The day-long workshop featured a medley of presenters with broad expertise in snow and avalanche research, avalanche forecasting, ski patrolling, ski guiding, avalanche education, mountain search and rescue operations, and institutional risk management within the scope of outdoor education and recreation.
Titled “Lessons Learned," the workshop was essentially a compilation of personal incident accounts in which significant injury or loss due to avalanche hazard occurred or was narrowly avoided.
Throughout the day, many themes emerged, the most consistent of which was the simple truth that, regardless of years of experience, even the most renowned and experienced practitioners in the field of snow and avalanches are not immune to making mistakes. Efforts are made to maintain the highest standard of safety possible, and our professional community has made great strides in understanding the dynamic behaviors of snow and avalanches. Nevertheless, we continue to chart unknown territory, and the eerie reality of trial and error remains. By shining a spotlight on errors and miscalculations, and by being accountable for analyzing our mistakes, great contributions are made to this field.
The workshop began with Drew Leemon’s presentation entitled Risk Management: The NOLS Perspective. By sharing the ins and outs of the NOLS risk management system, long-time risk management director Leemon established a foundational framework for the workshop. With 28 years of incident data that documents remote rescues, medical emergencies, evacuations, and “near misses," NOLS analyzes risk and safety practices constantly and has established risk management as a core component of its institutional culture. With such an extensive incident database, NOLS has established a systematic incident review process. Through documenting, categorizing, and analyzing incidents, NOLS can learn from experience, strive for self-improvement, and continuously revise institutional program standards when necessary. Leemon broke the ice and set a standard of transparency and critical self-analysis for the rest of the workshop speakers.
As Randy Elliot put it so bluntly, “If you can’t be good, be lucky." Listening to renowned avalanche practitioners recount heart-pounding stories of narrowly avoiding getting caught in avalanches is unnerving. But, in recognizing how dynamic and complex the winter backcountry environment is, sometimes lessons are just learned the hard way and, as Karl Birkeland said, “as professionals, we need to recognize when we have close calls and change our behavior.” Workshop speakers, fortunately for all in attendance, walked away from their near-miss incidents informed, grateful, and better prepared for the future.
A recurring theme of the workshop was the importance of terrain selection. As Doug Chabot and Eric Knoff learned on several occasions, appropriate terrain selection is crucial when digging snowpits. Speaking about a slope outside of Cooke City, MT that he and his partner named “Almost Died," Chabot pointed out that it is never worth risking your life or your partners' lives (much less both at the same time) in order to collect data. In support of Chabot's views, Karl Birkeland stressed the significance of route selection and stressed the importance of ascending slopes by the safest up-track possible. Long-time Big Sky snow safety director Jon Ueland underscored the importance of always choosing islands of safety that will offer real protection. “You only know you are in a safe zone if all the snow around you disappears and you are still standing,” he said.
Professionalism and the importance of communication came up time and again throughout the workshop. Decisions made and opinions expressed by professionals carry great significance and can and should have a disproportionate influence on the safety and well being of others. As Nick Meyers, Mike Buotte, and Lynne Wolfe all noted, good communication skills are essential for avalanche control work, when discussing and analyzing the stability of the snowpack, or when simply working with a partner or team in an intense situation.
The familiarity professionals develop with a season’s snowpack or specific terrain can often pose a dangerous sense of overconfidence. As Karl Birkeland attested, it is so important to be thinking about the worst-case scenario and to be intentional with whom you travel in avalanche terrain. "Ski with a partner who will be thinking about avalanches and skiing appropriately,” he advised. And, as Nick Meyers suggested, “Ask yourself: are my thoughts, words, actions an asset or liability to the situation?”
An additional theme that surfaced was the fundamental importance of recognizing and assessing the type of avalanche problem you are dealing with. According to Rod Newcomb, professionals need to be aware that they often analyze the snowpack only from their scope of experience. Instead, he urged professionals to have heightened awareness of obscure and unfamiliar conditions, and to recognize that even the most experienced avalanche practitioners may still be novices to what can happen. Obscure and unexpected conditions are often responsible for close calls and fatalities involving professionals. However, depth hoar, he asserted, is the primary avalanche problem associated with patroller fatalities. According to Newcomb, a reliable rule of thumb with regard to depth hoar and depth hoar-like snowpacks is always "to expect the crown and the slide to exceed your expectation of how far it will propagate, and how large the slide will be.”
Experience with obscure stability conditions offered other workshop lessons. Doug Chabot recounted a near miss during which he learned that even low density, powder snow can act as a slab and produce avalanches. In reflecting on the 1996-97 winter avalanche that demolished the Shedhorn Lift at Big Sky, Scott Savage learned never to trust a rapid load on ice, a crust, or a hard surface, regardless of whether or not facets exist at the slab-weak layer interface. And, regardless of what kind of avalanche problem is believed to be present, Lynne Wolfe urged professionals to ask: “How detectable is the problem?” and “How manageable is the problem?” with the intention of forming an honest, specific, and unbiased opinion of current snowpack stability. Professionals often tend to overestimate manageability; even a small avalanche can pack quite a punch.
As risk management practices develop and become ever more ingrained in the work of outdoor professionals, “near miss” or close call incidents (in which significant injury or loss is narrowly avoided) have become focused opportunities for learning. However, the negative repercussions for outdoor professionals of such incidents -- which range from embarrassment to the loss of a job -- are not pleasant to contemplate. Putting egos aside, the workshop speakers recognized the obvious truth that if you end up spending years in avalanche terrain, accidents will occur, and sooner or later you are bound to make a mistake.
For more information, visit the GNFAC video archive on YouTube at www.youtube.com/user/AvalancheGuys where all the workshop presentations may be seen.
Bio:
Andrew Kiefer graduated from Prescott College this past spring and attended the professional development workshop during his internship with the GNFAC."
What's so funny 'bout peace love and understanding--Nick Lowe
Can't talk to a man who don't want to understand--Carol King
Can't talk to a man who don't want to understand--Carol King
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Re: Avalanche accidents Lessons learned
This cornice collapse skier involved Avalanche occurred last season. Look familer?
From NWAC
"Evidence of a human-triggered cornice avalanche that occurred 01/09/20 on Mt. Herman (east aspect, 5500ft). Two people were caught and carried in the avalanche, but uninjured. (Zack McGill Photo) A picture is worth a thousand words."
From NWAC
"Evidence of a human-triggered cornice avalanche that occurred 01/09/20 on Mt. Herman (east aspect, 5500ft). Two people were caught and carried in the avalanche, but uninjured. (Zack McGill Photo) A picture is worth a thousand words."
What's so funny 'bout peace love and understanding--Nick Lowe
Can't talk to a man who don't want to understand--Carol King
Can't talk to a man who don't want to understand--Carol King
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Re: Avalanche accidents Lessons learned
Back to mountain Safety.
Here is a good article that has links to other accidents including The Tunnel Creek accident at Stevens Pass in 2012. Its all about sharing this information so other can study the lessons learned.
The article details one of the human factor traps ( heuristic traps) that all BC skiers and boarders need to be aware of. This article is concerning one of those traps named "Social Proof. One member of this group was a commercial guide.
THEY JUST KEEP DYING: WHY ‘EXPERIENCED’ RIDERS ARE DYING IN PREDICTABLE AVALANCHE ACCIDENTS, AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT."
"Within minutes, having skinned only a few hundred yards, all six members of the party were buried by a slab avalanche measuring 800 x 600 feet, with an average depth of 5 feet, in some places 12 feet deep. One was buried to his neck and survived, trapped for four hours touching two of his buried friends but unable to move. The other five perished, some buried 10-12 feet deep."
And here is a link to the Pfd on the original research on heuristic traps by Ian McCammon
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source= ... k2HX7DGjnI
Here is a good article that has links to other accidents including The Tunnel Creek accident at Stevens Pass in 2012. Its all about sharing this information so other can study the lessons learned.
The article details one of the human factor traps ( heuristic traps) that all BC skiers and boarders need to be aware of. This article is concerning one of those traps named "Social Proof. One member of this group was a commercial guide.
THEY JUST KEEP DYING: WHY ‘EXPERIENCED’ RIDERS ARE DYING IN PREDICTABLE AVALANCHE ACCIDENTS, AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT."
"Within minutes, having skinned only a few hundred yards, all six members of the party were buried by a slab avalanche measuring 800 x 600 feet, with an average depth of 5 feet, in some places 12 feet deep. One was buried to his neck and survived, trapped for four hours touching two of his buried friends but unable to move. The other five perished, some buried 10-12 feet deep."
And here is a link to the Pfd on the original research on heuristic traps by Ian McCammon
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source= ... k2HX7DGjnI
What's so funny 'bout peace love and understanding--Nick Lowe
Can't talk to a man who don't want to understand--Carol King
Can't talk to a man who don't want to understand--Carol King
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Re: Avalanche accidents Lessons learned
good question. Lots of variables to consider. Human factors and how they influence decision making are important to understand.
In that recent near miss accident above lots of experienced skiers that I know would not have even climbed under that cornice given the conditions. But that person who fell through the cornice had already seen someone successfully climb that route and venture near that danger spot. That may have been a contributing human factor on his decision making ie following someone who you believe has greater knowledge or experience
What's so funny 'bout peace love and understanding--Nick Lowe
Can't talk to a man who don't want to understand--Carol King
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Re: Avalanche accidents Lessons learned
I remember when that happened to Kirsten on Balky hill rd. A friend on the East Chewuch had a spring time wet avy come through his back door.PAL wrote: ↑Sun Nov 14, 2021 9:06 am So Chris, how do you know? I would think you go, then see the conditions and do some weighing of the options. Do you go when it is deemed "considerable"? I am just wondering how you personally determine when it's safe. I get the feeling you are very careful. Of course, you know the risks involved.
The snows we are getting now are hopefully building a great sno pack for the season.
And here is a thought. I had a friend one year, driving up Balky Hill one night. On the steeper part of the road there is a hillside on the left and before she knew it, it avalanched down and partially buried her car. She had to climb out a window to go get help down below. She was quite freaked.
Happens in Elbow Coulee sometimes in a spot before the old rock quarries.
When conditions are such that the Avy center rates them as extreme, I don't have the skills or the deep powder machine to snowmobile up the hwy anyway and trail breaking is near impossible.
I like to stay in touch and observe the snow pack so I'll go out most any other day. The option not to ski is always there.
Terrain selection is paramount. But I have made my share of mountain mistakes when desire has won over rational decision making. Human factors.
To expound on your previous question, it's also important to follow safe practice protocols even when you don't think there is a hazard. They need to become habit, like always stopping at a stop sign even if there is no car coming, because one day, that car will be there without you 'seeing" the hazard.
Btw, the local guide service teaches that its ok to park in avalanche run out zones (Spire gully) if you don't think that there is a hazard. That has been a point of contention for years. Many feel that they should lead by example when teaching novices who are mirroring their behavior and may not understand when there is a hazard concern.
I had a long text discussion with a guide on not under estimating avalanche potential and how excessive hubris can be deadly (human factors).
That conversation came about when I heard that the guides had ventured up the hairpin valley early in the season and took a photo as an avalanche was coming down behind them. She concluded that their decision-making was correct because the Avalanche had not reached their skin track but it stopped right before reaching their skin track
That's when I went into my don't underestimate Spire Gully rant.
She concluded that my conversation was just all part of a guide Vendetta but I was really just doing what I do in concern for her safety.
Right after the next storm a week later, Spire gully slid to the road. I believe she had underestimated the effects of wind loading and loading in the deposition zones that occurs under steep walls way above them.
Fast forward a year or two and one guide underestimated the effects wind loading way above when a wall released an avalanche down on their group, critically burying one client and involving another client.
So two clients hit by the same avalanche, clearly a breach of safety protocol on a day where I believe NWAC said don't go into avalanche terrain that day. But there they were, money collected, in Avalanche terrain and it could have cost the life of at least one of their clients.
I was out that day. Our initial objective, formulated the night before at home changed after we were up in the mountains and observed the conditions. My partner and I chose to ski relatively safer terrain.
The mountains don't care what credentials or experience you think you might have.
What's so funny 'bout peace love and understanding--Nick Lowe
Can't talk to a man who don't want to understand--Carol King
Can't talk to a man who don't want to understand--Carol King
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Re: Avalanche accidents Lessons learned
PAL wrote: ↑Sun Nov 14, 2021 9:06 am So Chris, how do you know? I would think you go, then see the conditions and do some weighing of the options. Do you go when it is deemed "considerable"? I am just wondering how you personally determine when it's safe. I get the feeling you are very careful. Of course, you know the risks involved.
The snows we are getting now are hopefully building a great sno pack for the season.
And here is a thought. I had a friend one year, driving up Balky Hill one night. On the steeper part of the road there is a hillside on the left and before she knew it, it avalanched down and partially buried her car. She had to climb out a window to go get help down below. She was quite freaked.
Happens in Elbow Coulee sometimes in a spot before the old rock quarries.
What's so funny 'bout peace love and understanding--Nick Lowe
Can't talk to a man who don't want to understand--Carol King
Can't talk to a man who don't want to understand--Carol King
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Re: Avalanche accidents Lessons learned
As always, be careful following advice and opinions that you read on the internet when it concerns personal risk.mister_coffee wrote: ↑Sat Nov 13, 2021 8:42 pm To some extent we have it easier in the Cascades than in non-maritime ranges like the Rockies and the Alaska Range. Most of the time here the avalanche hazard is either insanely high or pretty low. There are a lot fewer ambiguous situations than you might see in Banff or Denali. We also have the advantage that most of our snowpack comes during a few relatively large storms.
You can and should do a lot of hazard evaluation before you even leave your house.
If average or maximum temperatures have recently significantly increased (like the last few days), you aren't going to have much fun backcountry skiing today. If a big storm is putting a lot of precipitation down (either rain or snow) you also aren't going to have a lot of fun on the ski. You also need to watch out for that period in the spring when minimum temperatures first stay above freezing.
On the other hand, melt-freeze cycles can produce very strong and very safe snowpacks. Also, sometimes the very best and safest skiing can happen after a warm front passes through with high freezing levels that gradually cools off and leaves a few inches of new snow well-bonded to the well and fully refrozen snowpack. Optimum karma like that occurs only infrequently, though.
The words you want to see in the avalanche hazard reports here is "isothermal snowpack".
Especially when you read generalized opinion statements such as this;
Quote "Most of the time here the avalanche hazard is either insanely high or pretty low." End quote
Or
Quote "You can and should do a lot of hazard evaluation before you even leave your house." End quote
One saying we have is;
You don't know until you go. I remember one guide posting online (TAY) about our conditions here on the East side NCascades while he was away on a trip for two weeks.
It would be fair to say, please disregard David's post and seek expert advice.
Highly recommend Bruce Tempers book "Staying Alive in avalanche terrain".
Here's an example of expert advise from Mr. Temper.
https://snowbrains.com/5-new-avalanche- ... need-know/
"47% of avalanche deaths occur when conditions are reported as “considerable.” Most weekend warrior backcountry skiers back off on their plans in avalanche danger points to high and extreme zones, but “considerable” conditions are harder to predict, and where almost half of all avalanche deaths occur. While the majority of ski tours that take place under these conditions will have a happy outcome, skills such as safe route-finding, keeping a handle on group dynamics, and knowing how to undertake a rescue and find buried victims is of paramount importance."
What's so funny 'bout peace love and understanding--Nick Lowe
Can't talk to a man who don't want to understand--Carol King
Can't talk to a man who don't want to understand--Carol King
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Re: Avalanche accidents Lessons learned
don't know if he was experienced or not.
Mountain accidents kill both the experienced and inexperienced including commercial guides and their clients.
One important aspect of learning mountain safety is to read previous accident reports and try to learn the lesson from that accident in the hope that you may be able to avoid a similar mistake.
Here are many of those accident reports compiled by the Colorado Avalanche Center including a report were a Wa.State lady BC skier traveling solo fell through a cornice and triggered an avalanche.
She wasn't so lucky. She died.
https://www.avalanche.state.co.us/accidents/us/
What's so funny 'bout peace love and understanding--Nick Lowe
Can't talk to a man who don't want to understand--Carol King
Can't talk to a man who don't want to understand--Carol King
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Re: Avalanche accidents Lessons learned
Report for that Blue Peak near miss accident. From the picture it looks like the person who skined up higher towards blue peak along the cornice, also put himself at risk. At the very least added strain to the cornice making it more likely to fail when the next person followed.
Once an accident is set in motion, luck often determines the outcome.
https://nwac.us/public-obs/7130/
"Around 11am 11/10/2021 a young man boot packed to the top of blue lake col then headed right along the edge of the cornice. He was too close to the edge and fell through. After talking with him after heading up that way later in the day he told us the story and we saw the 6 inche wind slab that broke after the cornice released. Some of the snow ripped to the rocks where he slid through. Somehow he managed to stop before getting pulled to the lower half of the snow with car sized cornice chunks. Decent sized slide that maybe could have buried him but he was sure lucky to not get hit by the cornice chunks. The cornices are building and his complacency led to a scary situation. I didn’t get a photo from below but I attached a photo of his track that fell through the cornice."
Once an accident is set in motion, luck often determines the outcome.
https://nwac.us/public-obs/7130/
"Around 11am 11/10/2021 a young man boot packed to the top of blue lake col then headed right along the edge of the cornice. He was too close to the edge and fell through. After talking with him after heading up that way later in the day he told us the story and we saw the 6 inche wind slab that broke after the cornice released. Some of the snow ripped to the rocks where he slid through. Somehow he managed to stop before getting pulled to the lower half of the snow with car sized cornice chunks. Decent sized slide that maybe could have buried him but he was sure lucky to not get hit by the cornice chunks. The cornices are building and his complacency led to a scary situation. I didn’t get a photo from below but I attached a photo of his track that fell through the cornice."
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Last edited by Fun CH on Tue Nov 16, 2021 3:16 pm, edited 1 time in total.
What's so funny 'bout peace love and understanding--Nick Lowe
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Re: Avalanche accidents Lessons learned
A friend reports on Nov 10th "some kind of skier triggered cornice collapse/ slide today. Unstable cornices just like you said. It stepped down 3 layers and caused a surface sympathetic slide to the lookers right."
Looks like the entire Blue peak cornice was triggered.
Looks like the entire Blue peak cornice was triggered.
Last edited by Fun CH on Tue Nov 16, 2021 3:15 pm, edited 1 time in total.
What's so funny 'bout peace love and understanding--Nick Lowe
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Avalanche accidents Lessons learned
Yesterday (report from Nov 8th)I observed two recent (within 24 hours) slab avalanche releases below the North facing Blue peak col cornice. Surprising to see how large that cornice is this early in the season. Note: Recently built cornices tend to be weak.
There is a warming and or possible rain crust (altitude dependent) from last weeks 35 degree temps at 6680' and rain potential . About a 15" of recent snow up higher in wind protected areas with the usual filling drifts and blown off high spots. Snow was cold in the shade and warming on sun exposed aspects.
To start the tour, I was able to get on the summer trail in order to avoid the low cover trees until the main avy run out path (one of three in that low zone area).
From there a new skin track was available which I used to gain a bit more altitude. When it was clear that that skin track went up the steepest historical avalanche prone terrain climbers right of 'Dr. Rich's Gap' and halfway up 'Good2go bowl', I broke a trail climbers left to standard route, which is relatively safer from Avalanche explosure, and on up to the South Early Winters spire climbers ridge where I was able to observe that recent Avalanche activity. Climbing up to Ridge at that point does involve some risk of avy depending up loading structure which needs to be carefully evaluated.
The gist of it is, there is a significant crust which is a potential (avy sliding) bed surface
the WSDOT is correct to close the Hwy as indicated due to more new snow and warming. Recipe for Avalanche potential.
There is a warming and or possible rain crust (altitude dependent) from last weeks 35 degree temps at 6680' and rain potential . About a 15" of recent snow up higher in wind protected areas with the usual filling drifts and blown off high spots. Snow was cold in the shade and warming on sun exposed aspects.
To start the tour, I was able to get on the summer trail in order to avoid the low cover trees until the main avy run out path (one of three in that low zone area).
From there a new skin track was available which I used to gain a bit more altitude. When it was clear that that skin track went up the steepest historical avalanche prone terrain climbers right of 'Dr. Rich's Gap' and halfway up 'Good2go bowl', I broke a trail climbers left to standard route, which is relatively safer from Avalanche explosure, and on up to the South Early Winters spire climbers ridge where I was able to observe that recent Avalanche activity. Climbing up to Ridge at that point does involve some risk of avy depending up loading structure which needs to be carefully evaluated.
The gist of it is, there is a significant crust which is a potential (avy sliding) bed surface
the WSDOT is correct to close the Hwy as indicated due to more new snow and warming. Recipe for Avalanche potential.
What's so funny 'bout peace love and understanding--Nick Lowe
Can't talk to a man who don't want to understand--Carol King
Can't talk to a man who don't want to understand--Carol King
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